Archive | April, 2010

Pollwatch: Election campaign is now a war of movement rather than attrition (21 April 2010)

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Pollwatch: Election campaign is now a war of movement rather than attrition (21 April 2010)

Posted on 21 April 2010 by admin

The surge in support for the Lib Dems adds two element of huge uncertainty into the electoral equation

Although details vary between pollsters, the position on the eve of the second debate seems to be that the Conservatives and Lib Dems are fighting it out for first place, with support somewhere in the low 30% range.

Monday night’s ComRes Tory figure, which put them on 35%, would have been regarded as terrible 10 days ago but now almost seems like a good result for the Conservatives.

Labour seems narrowly but definitely in third at the moment, with support somewhere around 26-28%.

What is remarkable so far is Labour’s sangfroid in the face of this apparently disastrous situation, compared with the Conservatives’ obvious nerves. Part of this is of course the ludicrous first-past-the-post electoral system, which could still deliver Labour the most seats in this situation. But the dynamics of campaigns can be brutal when one falls into a consistent third, and it is possible that a spiral of decline could set in.

The bright side of the situation for Labour is that to win this election, something dramatic had to happen – if the campaign ground on as it had been, with the Tory lead falling slowly, Cameron would probably have just about won enough seats to form a minority government.

Now that it is a war of movement rather than attrition, anything can happen. And perversely, despite riding so low in the polls, there seems to have been a slight shift (including among Lib Dem voters) towards regarding a Labour-led government as being a good outcome of the election.

There are two elements of huge uncertainty in the equation. One is to what extent the Lib Dem surge is sustainable until polling day (although if they are still doing well next week, that should be reflected in the postal votes being cast and therefore the result).

This is simply imponderable, and depends on the perceived outcomes of the two debates, and whether the need for an interesting narrative to tell in the media will cause the overdone adulation of Nick Clegg to be replaced by another story – of battler Brown coming through, or Cameron keeping his nerve and steering safely to victory.

The other uncertainty is more measurable. A huge amount depends on who these new Lib Dems are. Several different versions are possible. In the surges of 1974 and 1983, the Labour vote collapsed in the party’s weaker seats, sending the Liberals and Alliance into good second places in a lot of Tory territory.

If this happens again (and is mirrored by a Tory collapse in their weaker seats in urban England) it could produce a lot of Lib Dem first places. On the other hand, if novelty is a big factor, the new Lib Dems may pop up in precisely the places where it can do them the least good – places where there has been little local campaigning activity of the sort that has built up the Lib Dem strongholds. They could add a lot of votes, but few seats.

Mori’s poll for the Standard suggests deep inroads into Labour demographic territory (public sector workers, northern England) that is probably more consistent with the second theory. We must await detailed polls of the marginal seats contested between Labour and Conservatives to get a sense of what is perhaps the crucial question – which of the two parties is losing most where it counts?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/21/pollwatch-election-campaign-war

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Pollwatch: Election 2010 could be the death knell for first past the post (18 April 2010)

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Pollwatch: Election 2010 could be the death knell for first past the post (18 April 2010)

Posted on 18 April 2010 by admin

Electoral system could not long survive a perverse outcome in which first party comes third, and third comes first

Small-c conservatives often argue that before a reform is introduced it should be tested not only against normal operating conditions but also against unlikely possibilities, because these can produce unintended consequences.

The first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system is capable of spectacular malfunctions, particularly when there are more than two parties in contention for the lead. YouGov, ComRes and Bpix this weekend showed four-point spreads between first and third parties, and election outcomes that seemed extreme must now be considered.

The Bpix numbers for the Mail on Sunday (Lib Dems 32, Tories 31, Labour 28) would produce a bizarre result on uniform swing. The largest party in votes, the Lib Dems, would come third in seats with 120, and the smallest of the three main parties, Labour, would win the largest number of seats – 268. The Tories would have 230.

If we transpose the Conservative and Labour Bpix percentages, then despite the Lib Dems being the largest party on 32%, Labour with 31% would have 323 seats in parliament. While not quite an overall majority, it would be an effective majority given the Speaker’s neutrality and Sinn Féin MPs not participating.

The reason for these peculiar possibilities is to be found in geography. Labour is resilient to a falling national share because it has an efficiently distributed vote – a large number of low-turnout strongholds, competitive marginals and few votes in its high-turnout hopeless seats.

But because Lib Dem support is fairly evenly spread, it is hard for that party to translate broad increases in its share of the vote into seat gains, and the gains it does manage tend to come from the Conservatives.

The Lib Dems received respectable 20-30% losing shares in many constituencies in 2005, and a 10-point increase across the board would merely produce impressive 30-40% losing scores in most of these seats.

The electoral system could not survive a perverse outcome in which the first party comes third and the third party comes first – or one in which the second-placed party has an overall majority, despite the support of fewer than one voter in three. Either case would make Florida in 2000 look like a model of democracy. There would be a justified crisis of confidence in a political system that had produced such a travesty.

Gordon Brown’s preferred reform of the alternative vote (AV) would help the Lib Dems win more seats under AV than FPTP. Rather than being unfairly penalised in a near-even, three-way split of votes, the Lib Dems would hit the jackpot. If three party politics is here to stay, Labour would be best advised to modify its position on AV, and go instead for a proportional system based on related principles, namely single transferable vote (STV) or AV-plus, which both involve multi-member constituencies. But the prime minister does not seem ready to get rid of single-member seats.

The Conservatives’ problem is potentially worse. Their atavistic love of FPTP could surely not survive such a refutation of the claim that it gives stability and a clear choice of government.

Even if a single-party government emerged on the basis of 32% support and a one-point lead – or deficit – in votes, it could not claim a “mandate” without provoking mocking laughter.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/18/pollwatch-election-first-past-the-post

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Pollwatch: Debate sees Lib Dems’ star rising to set Tory nerves jangling (April 16 2010)

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Pollwatch: Debate sees Lib Dems’ star rising to set Tory nerves jangling (April 16 2010)

Posted on 16 April 2010 by admin

The party in yellow always sees a spike during campiagns due to higher visibility but Conservatives should still be wary

Even if the first reports of the post-debate boost for Nick Clegg were a bit outlandish, it seems that the leadership debates have added to the usual lift that the Lib Dems get from election campaigns.

There have been already been several inconsistent accounts published concerning which of the larger two parties would suffer most from a rise in Lib Dem support. The answer must be, unfortunately, “it depends”. But in terms of the parties’ aims in the election it is more likely that the Conservatives will have most cause to regret Nick Clegg’s equal time and his effective use of it.

Gaining seats from the Lib Dems is an element of the Conservative strategy to get over the winning line of 326 seats in the new House of Commons. Pre-campaign polls with figures like Con 40, Lib Dem 19 implied a 5.5% swing towards the Tories. Based on uniform swing (a particularly rough approximation when it comes to Lib Dems) this would gain 23 seats for the Tories, an important contribution to their target of 116 gains, which allowing for boundary changes would get them to 326.

Even before the debate, there was evidence that the Conservatives were struggling in their efforts to win seats from the Lib Dems. YouGov’s regional trends showed them doing poorly in the south-west, where many of these seats are located, and the Crosby/Textor poll of marginal seats showed no Tory progress at all in the Lib Dem held marginals. The Tories may still pick off a few of the 23, but might also lose one or two to the Lib Dems such as Eastbourne. If there are no net gains from the Lib Dems, the Tories have to find 23 seats from somewhere else. It gets worse – the party is under-performing in Scotland and would be lucky to gain any of the apparently vulnerable SNP seats or more than one or two from Scottish Labour.

There are 24 Lib Dem seats and two SNP among the 116 numerically most vulnerable to the Conservatives. If there were a neat, even swing from all others to the Tories, seat 116 (Waveney in Suffolk) would fall with a 6% swing. Taking Lib Dem and SNP seats, plus the more ambitious targets from Scottish Labour, off the boards means the required swing from Labour alone increases to 8 per cent. An 8-point national swing implies a Conservative lead over Labour of 13 points, although allowing for a 1.5% overperformance in targets from Labour would take it down to the Tories needing a 10-point lead to win. It is still a very tall order.

But what about Labour? A Lib Dem surge harms them as well, but perhaps less than one might think. There are eight Labour seats vulnerable to a 2% swing to the Lib Dems, but a sharp swing of 7% would only net the Lib Dems 10 more seats from Labour. In practice, however, Lib Dems always perform patchily, winning outsized swings to gain seats that did not look at all marginal (like Solihull and Manchester Withington in 2005) while missing some apparently easier targets (like Dorset West and Oxford East in 2005).

A national boost would probably in reality help bring in some long shots. The real danger for Labour is that Lib Dem voters might become unwilling to give tactical votes to vulnerable Labour candidates in marginals where there is a Labour-Conservative fight, and thereby hand the seat to the Tories (as happened in several places in 2005, like Shipley and St Albans). This would in turn make it easier for the Tories to gain the seats they need at Labour’s expense. But there were already widespread conjectures about “tactical unwind” happening.

If the Lib Dem boost is sustained, as it may well be (although not at the fanciful levels suggested in initial reports of the ComRes poll), it poses a clear threat to the Conservatives’ chances of achieving their strategic aim, a parliamentary majority (or a sufficiently predominant position in a hung parliament to run a minority government which could reliably get legislation passed).

It poses less of a threat to Labour, because fewer seats are directly at stake, and Labour’s strategic aims are more nuanced than just the big ask of a parliamentary majority. By brandishing an olive branch at Clegg during the debate, Gordon Brown was bidding for progressive voters for Labour, but also preparing the ground for Labour’s Plan B – a coalition, or minority government with an explicit accommodation with the Lib Dems.

Published 16/4/2010

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/16/pollwatch-debate-lib-dems-tories

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Reading the Political Map (April 15 2010)

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Reading the Political Map (April 15 2010)

Posted on 15 April 2010 by admin

Westminster voting intention polls in Scotland show that remarkably little has changed since 2005, particularly in the gap between Labour and Conservative where there seems to be a swing of between 0 and 2 per cent. The principal difference seems to be a fairly strong swing from Lib Dem to SNP. What appears to be happening (although the reality is that movements in public opinion are always complex and flow in many directions between any two points) is that there is a floating centre-left vote in Scotland that has chosen differently in different elections. In 2005 the SNP was at a low ebb and the Lib Dems performed strongly with voters critical of Labour on Iraq and the apparent centre-right drift of UK Labour policy. In 2007 the SNP benefited, but in 2010 Labour seem to have rallied some of it and the SNP has also picked up.

In terms of seats, projecting the trends across Scotland shows only one seat changing hands since 2005 (other than Glasgow North East going from Speaker to Labour). This would be an SNP gain from Labour in the highly marginal Ochil & South Perthshire constituency.

However, swing is unlikely to be uniform and there may be changes during the election campaign. In particular, assuming that a drop from 23 per cent to 14 per cent for the Lib Dems in the Scotland polls will lead to a 9-point drop in their support everywhere will give wrong results. The Lib Dems tend to gain support during campaigns, and are also good at playing the First Past the Post electoral system to target the seats they need to win. It would be foolish to count them out in the marginals despite their apparently poor poll showing. One seat where they stand a very good chance is Dunfermline & West Fife, where they won the by-election in 2006; they are also strong contenders in Edinburgh South and not to be dismissed in a few others such as Edinburgh North & Leith, Aberdeen South and maybe Glasgow North (although they may have maxed out their appeal there  in 2005). On the other hand, they risk losing a couple, such as the Berwickshire seat and Argyll & Bute, which went to the Tories and SNP respectively in 2007.

Scotland would contribute no Tory gains at all on a uniform swing, even if the UK polls are correct and the Conservatives end up on the cusp of an overall majority. This would naturally have significant implications for Scotland’s place in a Tory Britain. At least, thanks to devolution, the Tories would not need to staff a full Scottish Office.

The Conservatives can hold out the hope that their Scottish MPs could fit into a taxi rather than a phone box, but the target of 11 Tory seats in Scotland is extremely wishful thinking. They have one highly realistic target (Dumfries & Galloway, although even there they face a canny local politician in Russell Brown) and a couple of seats where there is a Tory vote to be mobilised but where they start a long way behind or face other competition – Edinburgh South, after all, has Morningside and Fairmilehead within its boundaries, and there is also Stirling which sent Michael Forsyth to Parliament in 1983-97. They have some hope of ‘decapitation’ of two leading Scottish Labour figures, Jim Murphy in Renfrewshire East and Alistair Darling in Edinburgh South West, but neither looks likely at present. As well as Lib Dem Berwickshire, they might also try to sneak a win in an SNP seat such as Perth & North Perthshire.

The puzzle of the Westminster election is perhaps why the SNP are so poorly rewarded for a significant increase in their support since 2005. The problem for them is that their vote is fairly evenly spread in urban Scotland, so the main result is becoming a slightly better second to Labour across the Central Belt. They start from miles behind even in some seats where they performed well in the 2007 election, such as Falkirk and North Ayrshire. Other than Ochil, Dundee West and perhaps Kilmarnock & Loudoun, they need monster swings to get anywhere. They achieved such a swing in the by-election in Glasgow East in 2008, but the SNP has never before held a Westminster by-election gain from Labour and it would be surprising if Glasgow East did not revert to its usual Labour colours.

The election in Scotland is therefore highly likely to confirm Labour’s dominance in Westminster representation, and see the Lib Dems, Tories and SNP chip away a marginal seat or two each on the basis of local factors. It may set up a rather awkward situation for Scotland, in which a UK Conservative government and a Scottish government run by the SNP have to work together, despite neither party having many MPs at Westminster.

http://www.scotlandvotes.com/blog/reading-the-political-map

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Pollwatch: Conservative lead narrowed, but two polls don’t make a trend (14 April 2010)

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Pollwatch: Conservative lead narrowed, but two polls don’t make a trend (14 April 2010)

Posted on 14 April 2010 by admin

The latest findings from Populus and ComRes may be just a statistical quirk

Two polls today, by Populus for the Times and ComRes for ITN and the Independent, narrowed the Conservative lead, dangerously so for David Cameron’s hopes of becoming prime minister. It remains to be seen whether these are the start of a trend or a statistical quirk.

Across the board, the polls barely shifted in the first week of the campaign. The Conservatives remain within a point or two of 38% support, and Labour within a similar distance of 31% in nearly all the polls. Perhaps this is not very surprising, because the first week was not particularly engaging and the big setpiece events of the campaign – the manifesto launches and the leader debates – were all yet to take place.

We can expect more change and volatility if and when the events of the campaign start to excite the public. But if the polls remain constant at this level, the end of the campaign and the result will be pretty exciting stuff, because this is probably on the cusp of what the Conservatives need for an overall majority.

Translating polls and vote shares into who will win how many seats at the election is an imprecise business, and depends on a lot of assumptions. The simplest is “uniform national swing”, which takes the change in each party’s vote since 2005 and then applies that change in every constituency. If voters behaved this way, the Tories would need a lead of about 11 points to win a majority.

But there are good reasons for assuming that swing will not be uniform. In local elections and polls concentrating on marginal seats the Tories seem to be outperforming the national swing by a point or two. Their strategy since 2005 has involved relentless targeting of money, promises, messages and campaigning on the marginal seats to achieve this, and it would seem to be working.

It is also to do with political strategy: Tony Blair’s rapport with swing voters in marginal seats long outlasted his honeymoon with metropolitan liberal opinion. Cameron, as shown in the detail of the Guardian’s latest ICM poll, seems to be going over well with the same voters (in social classes C1 and C2) that Blair targeted so successfully. The swing in the marginals is assisted, although not by as much as could have been expected last week, by people who had previously voted Labour for tactical reasons abandoning the party for the Lib Dems or Greens.

Another factor that seems to be helping the Conservatives is the way changes in voting intention vary by region. According to YouGov’s combined data (reported in PoliticsHome), the swing is strong in several regions that are rich in Labour-held marginals (north-west, west Midlands and east Midlands), adequate to win most of the targets in other regions (south-east) and low in the regions where there is little room for Conservative gains from Labour (Scotland, south-west). However, local sub-samples can be unreliable and there is room for more polling to be done to sample what is going on in the English regions and Wales in particular (polling in Scotland is pretty consistent).

Against these factors that are helping the Conservatives, there are a couple of adjustments that point the other way. Uniform swing assumptions are bad at predicting how the Lib Dems will do, because strong local campaigns and popular incumbents can resist national swings. Uniform swing would see the Conservatives winning large numbers of Lib Dem seats, but this is almost certainly not going to happen.

Then there is turnout. A large part of the electoral system’s bias against the Conservatives stems from the tendency for the Tories to pile up large numbers of votes in their safe seats because turnout is relatively high, and for safe Labour seats to have low turnout. If a close election brings out Tory voters in their droves in the countryside and the suburbs, as it did in 1992, but does not cause Labour turnout in safe seats to rise much, it will not help the Tories win more seats.

All this considered, the lead the Conservatives need falls to around 7% or so, similar to 1992 when a Conservative lead of 7.5% was enough for a majority of 21 seats. However, one cannot be certain. If they are lucky with turnout and varying swing, they might squeak across the winning post with a lead of 5%; if the cards fall badly for them, and Labour grassroots campaigning counteracts the Ashcroft marginal strategy, they could fall just short with a lead of 9%.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/14/pollwatch-conservative-lead-narrows

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Push Me, Pull Me (April 14 2010)

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Push Me, Pull Me (April 14 2010)

Posted on 14 April 2010 by admin

Election polling has evolved since the 1970s and pushes parties towards the centre ground

Election campaigns have always been changing and evolving.  The idea of an election campaign as a coherent story, unfolding over time, does not really apply to some contests such as 1950 and 1955, when there was an almost aimless meandering across the policy landscape punctuated by the big speeches by the party leaders and other main figures.   The election campaign took more shape in 1959 – essentially the first television election – and through the 1960s and 1970s. There have been polls since 1945, but the close election of 1964 was arguably the first in which the ‘horse race’ aspect of an election started to dominate in the media with polls providing the evidence for the state of the race every few days.  In 1970, the Conservative campaign deployed the first effective use of modern negative campaigning.  Nine years later, Saatchi & Saatchi famously revolutionised election advertising.  But in between the fall of Edward Heath and the rise of Margaret Thatcher, there was another important development.

Perhaps the first poll-driven election campaign was Harold Wilson’s Labour campaign of February 1974, which used MORI to pilot the party to a narrow and somewhat improbable victory. Wilson was brilliantly reactive, responding to campaign events such as bad economic figures and government missteps and changing the terms of debate from the Tories’ ground of ‘Who Governs?’ to Labour’s – the government’s record on prices and industrial relations. Wilson astutely dodged around the contents of Labour’s manifesto, which was a left-wing programme of nationalisation he had no intention of implementing. The purpose of the polls in this election was not to look at headline figures, but at the underlying attitudes and opinions on the issues that were driving political choice. The polls have been used to craft the parties’ narratives during the election ever since. Although focus groups were used in the 1970s, their real heyday has been since 1997 when they have tested party messages and the electorate’s perceptions exhaustively.  The 1990s also saw the rise of the ‘grid’, in which party messages, issues and leading figures are deployed in a rigorously planned fashion.

On one level, a modern election campaign is a fierce contest for control of the narrative.  Each party is attempting to tell their story about the state of Britain and what needs to be done, and calculates that if they are able to do so unobstructed then their narrative will convince people to vote for them.  However, it is never possible to get the message across unobstructed.  The parties compete with each other, with the media (now in all its electronic wildness) and with events (both ‘known unknowns’ like announcements of economic statistics, and ‘unknown unknowns’ that happen unpredictably) for control over the agenda. Crudely, a party ‘wins’ a day in the campaign if the real events that are prominent in the media conform to what was planned in its grid. As well as all this chaotic competition, there is also feedback – that the profusion of public and private polls is giving everyone nearly instant knowledge of what is going well or badly, and who is ahead and behind. Polls can change a campaign instantly, with a good poll creating confidence or complacency, and bad ones causing lurches into despair. It is not without reason that they are sometimes compared to mood-altering drugs.

The 2010 campaign has more published polls than ever before, with the almost-daily YouGov series for the Sun being a notable innovation. To continue the drug analogy, the political classes are getting habituated through heavy use, and this is perhaps not a bad thing. Every now and then there is a ‘rogue’ poll outside the normal range of sampling error, and these tend to attract the most interest in the media for the standard ‘man bites dog’ reason that the unusual is news. In past elections, rogue polls have sometimes had major influence, famously so in 1987 when one precipitated ‘Wobbly Thursday’ in the Tory campaign. But thanks to the sheer weight of polling, rogues are now likely to be swamped by polls that are closer to the mark. It will take a proper trend, not an outlier, for voting intention polls to change the tone of an election.

It is at a deep level that the parties’ strategies are influenced by the findings from their private polling about what the public wants to hear. One cannot blame the parties for using the best available techniques for crafting and putting out their messages. Nor can one blame the electors for thinking that the parties sound the same, because they are all talking at the same swing voters in marginal seats in the same sort of language. It is a consequence of the electoral system.  And a question, perhaps, for another day.

http://www.critical-reaction.co.uk/2562/14-04-2010-push-me-pull-me

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Pollwatch: How the general election scores could change by 6 May (6 April 2010)

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Pollwatch: How the general election scores could change by 6 May (6 April 2010)

Posted on 06 April 2010 by admin

The polls published yesterday may have appeared to be all over the place – but were more consistent than they looked

The polls published just before the election was called may have appeared to be all over the place, but were more consistent than they looked. Conservative support stands at around 38-39%, and Labour somewhere around 31%. The Lib Dems stand firmly on 20% of the vote.

The Saturday and Tuesday ICM polls for the Guardian appeared rather different, as Labour’s rating was a below-average 29 points in the first poll and 33 points in the second. If this is a trend, Labour has reason for confidence, but it may just be sampling variation around a constant figure of 31.

However, polls measure how things stand now. Will the campaign change this, or will the next month of hectic campaigning, saturation media coverage and frenetic expenditure just confirm opinions held already?

Fortunately for my trade, campaigns make a difference. Of the last 10 elections, the only one in which there was no change between the polls at the start and the end of the campaign was October 1974. Every other election has seen significant movement in the polls during the campaign (although in 1970 it was self-cancelling and brought the final polls back to where they started).

Some elections, particularly 1992 and 1970, have seen significant differences between the final polls and the outcome, either because of late swing or methodological faults in the polls. However, the final polls were nearly spot on in 2005.

Comparing poll averages at the start and finish of the campaign in elections gives us some clues as to how things may change between now and 6 May.

If there is a general rule, it is that the Liberal Democrats (and their predecessors) gain support during the weeks just before polling day. In some elections this has been dramatic (eight-point gains in February 1974 and 1983) but a three-four point gain, as in the last four elections, is the least that can be expected. The only major exception was the disastrous Alliance effort in 1987, when Labour’s strong campaign and the increasingly obvious differences between the “Two Davids” (Steel and Owen) led to a five-point fall. In October 1974 an over-hyped Liberal campaign, featuring a campaign hovercraft, ran aground and left the Liberals a little behind where they started.

The main explanation for Lib Dem growth during campaigns is in the broadcasters’ adoption of stricter balance rules, so that Lib Dems are included in panel discussions. This campaign will have more potential to boost the Lib Dems than most, provided Nick Clegg makes a decent showing in the leaders’ debates.

The other reason is that voters become more aware of the tactical situation in their constituencies as the campaign progresses, and in constituencies where the Lib Dems are a presence this tends to build their support. For this reason, one should discount any constituency polls early in the campaign showing the Lib Dems way down, and their third place rival looking as if they will overtake them from where they were in 2005.

The other fairly consistent trend is that the party that starts the campaign season ahead will tend to drop in the polls by election day. If the party’s recorded support is particularly high, it will drop by more than average (as for Labour in 1997 and 2001, and the Conservatives in 1979, all of whom dropped five points). However, Labour managed to defy this pattern in 2005, with a small but crucial increase and a larger Conservative decline during the campaign. There is no consistent pattern of incumbent governments doing better or worse in the final polls than the first polls of the campaign.

How does all this apply to 2010? With fewer people, year by year, expressing strong attachment to one or other of the parties, more choice of parties, and lower turnout, there is certainly the potential for a campaign to shake things up, particularly given the unknown effect of the first leaders’ debates in a British election. There must be the possibility of something dramatic happening.

However, assuming this is an “average” campaign and using my two rough rules for changes during the campaign, the final polls would end up something like Con 37, Lab 31, Lib Dem 24. Allowing for a larger pro-Tory swing in the marginals, this is probably enough for a Conservative minority government in a hung parliament. As several sessions at last week’s Political Studies Association conference in Edinburgh demonstrated, this is where most academic experts’ rules of thumb and statistical models end up pointing; but we are all aware that these rules can suddenly stop working. Even so, prepare for a bumpy ride.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/06/labour-conservatives-polls-general-election

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